A Plague Of Locusts O’er The Land

Tadgh Kelly has a post up at GSW arguing that the delisting approach that Microsoft will be taking with XBLA marks the end of the platform as we know it.  Unfortunately, he makes his argument so hyperbolically that it obscures some of the good points that underlie his point.  Although I agree with his basic premise entirely, his conclusions start to run off the rails.

Kelly and I are in agreement that searching for games in XBL is currently unworkable.  Unless you know what you’re searching for, it’s nearly impossible to search for games with some reference to quality, popularity, or gameplay type.  We’re also in agreement that the proposed solution isn’t necessarily the ideal way to handle this concern.  But that’s where our opinions largely begin to diverge.

Kelly’s first argument is that the changes make XBL subject to “collusion.”  He notes correctly that the industry is subject to a lot of undue influence from money and power (a subject that we’ve commented on a number of times).  Kelly then proceeds to argue that these changes will lead XBL developers to seek similar influence, purchasing strong reviews in order to maintain access to their product.  The problem here is that Microsoft hasn’t set the bar particularly high: the delisting criterion is a Metacritic score below 65%.  Although publishers may seek to obtain undeserved 100%s, are developers really going to need to pay to keep a decent project floating above that 65% threshold?  I’m skeptical.  Furthermore, XBL developers are often highly constrained in terms of financial resources.  I can’t imagine them throwing enough cash in for a release to have a real impact on major reviewers.

Kelly goes on to assert that developers will attempt to cultivate relationships with XBL staff to avoid delisting and create games that Microsoft “wants.”  I find this hard to believe, not least because the 65%/6% criterion provides a clear, objective standard for removal.  Why would MS keep a game that wasn’t selling?  Business involves tough decisions all the time, but the presence of a standard suggests that this one has already been depersonalized.  Plus, the fact that the 6% conversion rate exists suggests that what truly matters is what gamers want.  If a game leads to sales, where is the incentive to make games that Microsoft favors?

His second argument is that the decision limits consumer choice.  In the abstract, it definitely does.  If there are individuals who wish to purchase Wing Commander, they will be unable to do so unless it clears a pre-defined threshold.  But in the practical sense, its unclear to me that a game that has not been purchased by more than 6% of the players who have tried it is truly desired by consumers in any real way.  Note that the timing of the sales are unimportant - whether the game is a “hit” that is immediately purchased by legions of fans or a slow burn that takes a while to gain a little steam, the benchmark is an overall sales statistic.  Kelly is entirely correct, however, when he notes that the cost of physically storing these games is minimal.

His third objection is really the crux of the matter, and Kelly clearly implies a point that he never really states explicitly: the XBL revision is solving the wrong problem.  Microsoft’s real concern is not in saving costs or restoring storage capacity (both of which are, as noted above, minimal).  Rather, it is ensuring that people can find games they want more easily so that they will be more likely to trust, and thus buy, games in the Marketplace.  He is also correct to note that there are better, more targeted ways to do this: I particularly like his suggestion of a community feature that would allow gamers to annotate their own mini-reviews, or provide information on best-sellers or games in genres that a player likes.  Delisting games helps to solve the problem, but it does so in a highly limited way - by removing only the least popular games - without providing the additional tools that gamers need to proactively go out an purchase more.  In short, this helps both gamers and Microsoft less than either wishes. 

Please note that the above rebuttal is not to say that Kelly is “wrong.”  There is some truth to the majority of his statements, and a great deal to some.  However, I would suggest that they don’t meet the cost/benefit threshold here - the damage here is largely very minor, and the fact remains that there is probably a better way or at least alternative ways to address Microsoft’s concerns.  But after this point is where I think Kelly is simply grossly mistaken.

His final conclusion is that XBLA is doomed.  He cites increasing competition from Sony and Nintendo, and a perception that MS isn’t willing to make large-scale changes to the system at this point.  Yet this seems pretty absurd to me.  Nintendo’s online offerings are poor at best, and nowhere near XBL in either content or accessibility.  The PS3 is growing, sure - but not nearly as fast and with much more difficulty in the online space (Home is clearly not living up to its promise yet and although PS3 is no longer the joke it once was, it has a long way to go).  Plus, Microsoft always retains the ability to make further changes i nthe future.  At best you can argue that MS is giving up some advantage by not moving more aggressively, but I have a great deal of trouble with the notion that it faces an imminent threat. 

Online strategy is always a controversial space in the gaming world.  Perhaps Kelly is simply using the “XBL is doomed” line as a hook on which to hang his more substantive critique of Microsoft’s own strategy.  But although I find a great deal of truth in his statements , I think he ultimately damages his own credibility by doing so.